SEC 主席关于美国资本市场热点问题演讲(全文)
2021年6月23日来自SEC的最新消息
美国证监会(SEC)主席Gary Gensler正在充实他对气候风险和工作场所问题的看法。
SEC 最近结束了关于扩大企业气候信息披露的公众意见征询期。它还成立了气候和 ESG 执法工作组。
在周三伦敦城市周的演讲中,Gensler 表示,SEC 已收到 400 多封关于环境、社会和治理问题的独特评论信。
现在,他开始更仔细地检查 SEC 可能正在寻找什么样的信息。
他已要求他的员工研究一系列更具体的指标,例如温室气体排放量,以确定哪些指标与投资者最相关。
Gensler 还想知道公司是否兑现了他们在气候相关问题上已经做出的任何承诺。
“此外,我已要求员工考虑对做出前瞻性气候承诺的公司,或在具有国家要求的司法管辖区开展重要业务的公司的潜在要求,以实现特定的、与气候相关的目标,”他说。
有关 ESG 的更多信息
ESG 是目前最热门的投资领域之一,Gensler 说他想要更多关于这些品质是什么以及它们如何营销的信息。
“我还要求员工考虑基金向投资者宣传可持续、绿色和‘ESG’的方式,以及支持这些主张的因素,”他说。
Gensler 还想要更多关于人力资本披露的信息,或者公司如何与员工互动。
“这建立在过去的机构工作基础上,可能包括许多指标,例如劳动力流动、技能和发展培训、薪酬、福利、劳动力人口统计数据(包括多样性)以及健康和安全,”詹斯勒说。“信息披露有助于公司筹集资金。它有助于在整个市场中有效配置资本。它可以帮助投资者将资金投向符合其投资需求的公司。”
根斯勒还表示,他将寻求提高美国国债买卖方式的透明度,并指出,“在大流行初期,我们目睹了影响国债市场关键部分的流动性恶化。”
Gensler 还希望修改有关实益所有权的规则,该规则要求上市公司的大股东披露信息。
“根据现行规则,拥有控制意图的上市公司股权证券的 5% 以上的受益所有人有 10 天的时间报告其所有权。我们已经 50 多年没有更新该截止日期了。......我已经询问员工我们如何更新这些规则,包括可能缩短报告截止日期。”
以下是演讲全文(中文翻译仅供参考,后附英文原文为准)
华盛顿特区
2021 年 6 月 23 日
谢谢你的介绍,Anthony。按照惯例,我想指出,我不是代表我的其他委员或SEC工作人员发言。
我很荣幸能在伦敦城市周再次发言。我上次在这里发言已经八年了。那是关于基准利率和伦敦银行同业拆借利率 (LIBOR)。我可能会回到那个话题,但我主要是想借此机会在证券交易委员会讨论改革议程的三个关键领域。
SEC 由富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福 (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) 和美国国会于 1930 年代成立,目的是在大萧条时期照顾工薪家庭的储蓄。
国会通过了一些基本理念相同的法律——其中,投资者可以决定他们希望承担的风险,只要公司提供适当的信息披露;工薪家庭的投资顾问应受到保护;并且证券交易所本身应该没有欺诈和操纵。
国会和早期SEC实施的这些保护措施经受住了时间的考验。我认为它们是我们经济成功的重要组成部分——为什么美国拥有世界上最大、最活跃的资本市场。
不过,我们不能满足于现状。技术总是在改变金融的面貌。自古以来,技术和金融就以共生关系共存。很久以前货币的发明就是如此。今天的移动经纪应用程序、机器人咨询和人工智能都是如此。
但我们的核心原则保持不变:保护投资者,促进个人和公司的资本形成,并维护他们之间公平、有序和有效的市场。
随着美国新政府的开始,我们在美国证券交易委员会最近发布了一项新的监管议程。它涵盖了很多方面:投资基金规则、内幕交易、股东民主、特殊目的收购公司等等。
今天,我不会涉及议程上的近50个项目。相反,我将重点关注三个广泛的领域:上市公司信息披露、市场结构和透明度举措。
上市公司披露
首先,我已要求员工就公司对气候风险和人力资本的强制性披露提出建议。
如今,投资者越来越希望了解发行人的气候风险。代表管理的数万亿美元资产的投资者正在寻找一致的、可比较的、对决策有用的信息,以确定是否以某种方式投资、出售或进行代理投票。
我已向工作人员征求建议,供我们考虑与气候风险相关的治理、战略和风险管理。此外,工作人员正在研究一系列具体指标,例如温室气体排放量,以确定哪些指标与我们市场中的投资者最相关。
此外,我已要求员工考虑对做出前瞻性气候承诺的公司或在具有国家要求的司法管辖区开展重要业务以实现特定的气候相关目标的公司的潜在要求。
我们刚刚在美国证券交易委员会收到了 400 多封关于这些主题的独特评论信,这是由我的专员Allison Herren Lee发布的公开声明。许多评论引用了不同团体的工作,例如气候相关财务披露工作组 (TCFD)。
我对加强披露的呼吁感到非常震惊。
我还要求员工考虑基金向投资者宣传可持续、绿色和“ESG”的方式,以及支持这些说法的因素是什么。
此外,投资者表示他们希望更好地了解公司最重要的资产之一:员工。为此,我已要求工作人员提出建议,供委员会考虑人力资本披露。
这建立在过去的机构工作基础上,可能包括许多指标,例如劳动力流动、技能和发展培训、薪酬、福利、劳动力人口统计数据(包括多样性)以及健康和安全。
披露有助于公司筹集资金。它有助于在整个市场中有效配置资本。它可以帮助投资者将资金投向符合其投资需求的公司。
市场结构
接下来,让我谈谈市场结构。在 SEC,我们负责监管近 45 万亿美元的公开股票市场和 50 万亿美元的固定收益市场,包括国债市场、公司债券、市政债券等。
我已经要求员工考虑技术对这些市场的每一个产生的影响,以及我们如何确保我们为这些市场带来最大的竞争和效率——对于投资者和发行人。
1998 年,随着互联网的出现,美国证监会制定了替代交易系统的新规则,以管理传统交易所的股票交易。2005 年,SEC继续更新股票市场规则,将场内和场外交易的框架整合在一起。我已经要求工作人员更广泛地了解我们如何更新我们针对股票市场当前技术和商业模式的规则。
例如,我曾要求SEC工作人员考虑称为订单流付款的做法。我们已经看到美国的订单流支付显着增加,这是您在英国禁止的。[1]
加拿大[2]和澳大利亚[3]也不允许经纪自营商将零售订单发送给批发商以换取付款。欧洲证券和市场管理局对订单流付款和最佳执行之间的这些潜在利益冲突表示担忧。[4]
今天,我们的市场基本上分为三个不同的部分。虽然公众在考虑买卖股票时通常会想到活跃的市场——纳斯达克和纽约证券交易所等市场——但这些大型公共交易所仅占 1 月份交易量的 53% 左右。[5]
那么其他 47% 的交易兴趣在哪里没有显示在点燃的市场上?它由替代交易系统(包括暗池)和场外批发商执行。因此,对这些平台的重大交易兴趣不一定反映在通常引用的全国最佳买卖报价中。
我已要求员工考虑这种目前构成的股权市场结构是否最能促进效率和竞争。
另外,我还询问了工作人员,我们如何才能提高美国国债在市场上买卖的方式的透明度和弹性。在大流行初期,我们目睹了影响国债市场关键部分的流动性恶化。我们在 2019 年 9 月和 2014 年 10 月也看到了这个市场的挑战。
我已要求工作人员与我们在美国财政部、美联储和商品期货交易委员会的同事密切合作,以确定我们是否可以为这些市场带来更大的透明度和弹性。
这项工作可以建立在委员会去年采取的行动的基础上,以提高部分平台的运营透明度以及之前有关交易后报告的改革。我还要求员工考虑国债现金和回购市场中央清算的潜在好处。
无论是股票市场、国债市场,还是与此相关的任何其他市场,对我来说,这一切都取决于我们如何根据新的商业模式和技术最好地提高效率并保持市场的弹性。
透明度
最后,我将简要讨论我们如何考虑更新与透明度相关的各种规则。
其中一个领域是实益所有权。1968 年,我们的国会要求上市公司的大股东披露信息,以帮助公众了解他们影响或控制该公司的能力。根据现行规则,拥有控制意图的上市公司股权证券的 5% 以上的受益所有人有 10 天的时间报告其所有权。
我们已经 50 多年没有更新该截止日期了。这些规则可能适用于1970年代,但鉴于当前市场和技术的快速发展,我怀疑它们是否继续有意义。我已经询问员工我们如何更新这些规则,包括可能缩短报告期限。
另一个领域是基于证券的掉期——本质上是个别公司的衍生品,这些衍生品在没有传统股权的情况下为公司提供敞口。那里的披露不像其他市场那样稳健。家族办公室 Archegos Capital Management 3 月份的倒闭提醒人们为什么这可能是相关的。
第三,我认为我们可以为卖空带来更多透明度。我们在该领域拥有近十二年前由国会授予的未使用权限。
最后,我已要求员工考虑我们是否应该提高与公司回购股票相关的透明度。
当投资者无法获取关键信息时,尤其是其他一些市场参与者可能拥有此类信息时,这种信息不对称会增加风险并降低流动性。我认为我们应该更新透明度制度,以更好地反映当前的商业模式和做法。
在我结束之前,我说我会回到 LIBOR。在我在这里的最后一次演讲中,我说监管机构“确定替代利率基准” [6]与强劲的基础市场至关重要。八年后换了一份工作,我仍然有这种感觉。
为此,我担心随着 LIBOR 被取代,一些商业银行正在倡导替代指数,这些指数仍然依赖于短期、无担保、银行对银行的贷款。
一种称为彭博短期银行收益率指数 (BSBY) 的此类利率具有许多与 LIBOR 相同的缺陷。它们都依赖于一个相对薄弱的市场,而这个市场在压力时期往往会消失。与 LIBOR 一样,我们看到一个温和的市场,承担着数百万亿美元的交易。当一个基准像这样不匹配时,就会有很大的经济动机来操纵它。
我上次在这里发言时,我基本上是说皇帝没有衣服。当时,皇帝是LIBOR。但请不要误会:尽管我们可能会夸大其词,但短期、无担保、银行间贷款仍然是没有穿衣服的皇帝。
Washington D.C.
June 23, 2021
Thank you for that kind introduction, Anthony. As is customary, I’d like to note that I’m not speaking on behalf of my fellow Commissioners or the SEC staff.
I’m honored to be speaking again at London City Week. It’s been eight years since I last spoke here. That was about benchmark interest rates and the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). I may come back to that, but I’m mostly going to take the opportunity to discuss three key areas of the reform agenda at the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The SEC was set up in the 1930s by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the U.S. Congress to look after working families’ savings in the depths of the Great Depression.
Congress passed a number of laws with the same basic ideas — among them, that investors get to decide what risks they wish to take, as long as companies provide appropriate disclosures; that working families should be protected with regard to their investment advisers; and that the stock exchanges themselves should be free of fraud and manipulation.
Those protections put in place by Congress and the early SEC have stood the test of time. I think they’re a large part of our economic success — why the U.S. has the largest, most vibrant capital markets in the world.
We can’t rest on our laurels, though. Technology is always changing the face of finance. Technology and finance have coexisted in a symbiotic relationship since antiquity. That was true long ago of the invention of money; it’s true today of mobile brokerage apps, robo-advising, and artificial intelligence.
But our core principles stay the same: protecting investors, facilitating capital formation for individuals and companies, and maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets between them.
As the new Administration has gotten underway in the United States, we at the SEC have recently published a new regulatory agenda. It covers a lot of ground: investment fund rules, insider trading, shareholder democracy, special purpose acquisition companies, and much more.
Today, I won’t cover the nearly 50 items on the agenda. Instead, I’m going to focus on three broad areas: public company disclosure, market structure, and transparency initiatives.
Public Company Disclosure
First, I’ve asked staff to put together recommendations on mandatory company disclosures on climate risk and on human capital.
Today, investors increasingly want to understand the climate risks of issuers. Investors representing literally tens of trillions of dollars of assets under management are looking for consistent, comparable, decision-useful information to determine whether to invest, sell, or make a proxy vote one way or another.
I’ve asked staff for recommendations for our consideration around governance, strategy, and risk management related to climate risk. In addition, staff are looking into a range of specific metrics, such as greenhouse gas emissions, to determine which are most relevant to investors in our markets.
Further, I’ve asked staff to consider potential requirements for companies that have made forward-looking climate commitments, or that have significant operations in jurisdictions with national requirements to achieve specific, climate-related targets.
We just received at the SEC more than 400 unique comment letters on these subjects in a public statement released by my fellow Commissioner Allison Herren Lee. Many comments referenced the work of various groups, such as the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).
I’m really struck by the call for enhanced disclosures.
I’ve also asked staff to consider the ways that funds are marketing themselves to investors as sustainable, green, and “ESG,” and what factors undergird those claims.
Further, investors have said that they want to better understand one of the most critical assets of a company: its people. To that end, I’ve asked staff to propose recommendations for the Commission’s consideration on human capital disclosure.
This builds on past agency work and could include a number of metrics, such as workforce turnover, skills and development training, compensation, benefits, workforce demographics including diversity, and health and safety.
Disclosure helps companies raise money. It helps the efficient allocation of capital across the market. And it helps investors place their money in the companies that fit their investing needs.
Market Structure
Next, let me turn to market structure. At the SEC, we oversee the nearly $45-trillion public equity markets and the $50-trillion fixed income markets, including Treasury markets, corporate bonds, municipal bonds, and more.
I’ve asked staff to consider the impact that technology has made in every one of these markets, and how we can ensure that we bring the greatest competition and efficiency to those markets — for investors and issuers.
In 1998, after the internet came along, the SEC stood-up new rules for alternative trading systems to govern equity trading off of traditional exchanges. The SEC continued to update equity market rules in 2005, stitching together a framework for both on- and off-exchange trading. I’ve asked the staff to take a broader look at how we might update our rules for the current technologies and business models in the equity markets.
For example, I’ve asked SEC staff to consider the practice known as payment for order flow. We’ve seen a notable rise in payment for order flow in the U.S., something that you’ve banned in the United Kingdom.[1]
Canada[2] and Australia[3] also don’t allow broker-dealers to route retail orders to wholesalers in return for payments. The European Securities and Markets Authority has raised concerns about these potential conflicts of interest between payment for order flow and best execution.[4]
Today, our markets essentially have three different segments. While the public generally thinks of lit markets when they think of buying or selling equities — markets like Nasdaq and the New York Stock Exchange — those big public exchanges only accounted for about 53 percent of trading volume in January.[5]
So where’s the other 47 percent — trading interest that’s not displayed on the lit markets? It’s executed by alternative trading systems, which include dark pools, and by off-exchange wholesalers. Thus, significant trading interest on these platforms is not necessarily being reflected in the commonly cited National Best Bid and Offer quote.
I’ve asked staff to consider whether this equity market structure, as currently composed, best promotes efficiency and competition.
Separately, I’ve asked staff how we can bring greater transparency and resiliency to the ways in which U.S. Treasury securities are bought and sold across the market. Early in the pandemic, we witnessed a deterioration of liquidity affecting critical parts of the Treasury market. We also saw challenges in this market in September 2019 and in October 2014.
I’ve asked staff to work closely with our colleagues at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to determine whether we can bring greater transparency and resiliency to these markets.
This work could build on Commission action last year to increase operational transparency to a subset of platforms as well as previous reforms regarding post-trade reporting. I’ve also asked staff to consider the potential benefits of central clearing in the Treasury cash and repo markets.
Whether it’s equity markets, Treasury markets, or any other markets for that matter, for me it all comes down to how we best promote efficiency and maintain resilient markets in light of new business models and technologies.
Transparency
Finally, I will briefly discuss how we might consider updating various rules related to transparency.
One such area is beneficial ownership. In 1968, our Congress mandated that large shareholders of public companies disclose information that helps the public understand their ability to influence or control that company. Under current rules, beneficial owners of more than 5 percent of a public company’s equity securities who have control intent have 10 days to report their ownership.
We haven’t updated that deadline in over 50 years. Those rules might’ve been appropriate for the 1970s, but I have my doubts about whether they continue to make sense given the rapidity of current markets and technologies. I’ve asked staff how we might update these rules, including possibly shortening reporting deadlines.
Another area is around security-based swaps — essentially, derivatives on individual companies that provide exposure to the company without traditional equity ownership. The disclosures there aren’t as robust as they are in the rest of the market. The collapse in March of the family office Archegos Capital Management is a reminder of why that could be relevant.
Thirdly, I think we can bring more transparency to short selling. We have unused authorities in that space that were granted by Congress nearly a dozen years ago.
Finally, I’ve asked staff to consider whether we should enhance transparency related to companies buying back their stock.
When investors cannot access critical information, particularly when some other market participants may have such information, such information asymmetry can increase risk and reduce liquidity. I believe we should update the transparency regimes to better reflect current business models and practices.
Before I close, I said I’d come back to LIBOR. In my last speech here, I said it was critical for regulators to “identify alternative interest rate benchmarks”[6] with a robust underlying market. Eight years and a different job later, I still feel that way.
To that end, I have concerns that as LIBOR is replaced, a number of commercial banks are advocating for replacement indices that are still reliant on short-term, unsecured, bank-to-bank lending.
One such rate, called the Bloomberg Short-Term Bank Yield Index (BSBY), has many of the same flaws as LIBOR. They both rely on a relatively thin market that tends to disappear in times of stress. Like with LIBOR, we’re seeing a modest market, shouldering the weight of hundreds of trillions of dollars in transactions. When a benchmark is mismatched like that, there’s a heck of an economic incentive to manipulate it.
When I last spoke here, I basically said the emperor had no clothes. At the time, the emperor was LIBOR. But make no mistake: Though we might gussy it up, short-term, unsecured, bank-to-bank lending is still the same emperor with no clothes.
I’ll leave you with that. Thank you.
[1] See, e.g., CFA Institute, “Payment for Order Flow in the United Kingdom” at 1 (2016), available at网页链接(PFOF)%20is%20the%20practice%20of%20market,order%20flow%20by%20market%20makers.
[2] See Joint CSA/IIROC Consultation Paper 23-406, “Internalization within the Canadian Equity Market” at 8 (March 12, 2019) (“UMIR 6.4 requires that trades by marketplace participants and related entities, subject to some exceptions, are executed on a marketplace. The main policy objectives of this provision are to strengthen liquidity, support price discovery and contribute to transparency. UMIR 6.4 is relevant to internalization in the context that in jurisdictions such as the United States, the execution of retail orders can occur off-marketplace. This notable difference is a contributing factor in how the Canadian market has evolved and is a consideration in our review and discussion of any future policy work.”), available at网页链接
[3] See Australian Securities & Investments Commission Market Supervision Update Issue 45, available at 网页链接
[4] See ESMA Newsletter - Nº21 (Feb. 26, 2021), available at 网页链接
[5] See Cboe Global Markets, available at 网页链接 (providing downloads of historical reported volume in NMS stocks by all self-regulatory organizations) (“SRO Volume Data”); see FINRA OTC (Non-ATS) Transparency Data, available at网页链接 (providing downloads of historical reported volume in NMS stocks by FINRA members) (“FINRA Member Volume Data”).
[6] See “Remarks of Chairman Gary Gensler at London City Week on Benchmark Interest Rates” (April 22, 2013), available at 网页链接
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